I took some time to look at the ASRS updates. The previous summary is here.

1. Waiting for pushback at Singapore Airport Ground notified: “Aircraft is cleared, but we are waiting AIR TUG.” The crew didn’t understand what “AIR TUG” was and interpreted it as waiting for another Airbus to pass. It turns out AIR TUG means tow tractor or pushback vehicle, but the crew had no idea, causing a misunderstanding. It seems that different countries have different names for many things; inconsistent terminology is a no-go.

2. Pushback direction was opposite at Manila Airport The crew’s exact words to Ground were: “Ground, Cockpit. We are cleared for Push Back S4 Heading East Runway 06” But for some unknown reason, the pushback on the ground was to the West. Later, Ramp Control had to change it to a “long push back” to G8E on L. It turns out that S4 usually involves pushing back West more often. Insufficient communication between the crew and ground caused a misunderstanding. Similar errors have occurred at a certain airport in China.

3. Forgot to lower Flaps before Taxiing I’ve seen this type of incident multiple times. Generally, in situations like unexpected Runway assignments, the crew’s workload increases, so forgetting the Flap setting is understandable. However, one airline’s system automatically prints a warning message in the cockpit if Flaps aren’t lowered before Taxi. This allows the pilot to notice the issue immediately.

4. Wrong Runway Incursions Most reports involve Narita. It seems there are quite a few pilots unfamiliar with the airport diagrams or who have forgotten them, though it also suggests that the airport’s ground routing is overly complex. There are also several cases for Haneda. Japanese pilots are familiar enough with this place, but even so, overconfidence can sometimes lead to taking the wrong route. Personally, I think communication errors are hard to avoid with voice-only ATC. An ideal solution would probably be to introduce a navigation system similar to those used in ground vehicles.

5. Near ground collision at Hong Kong While preparing to turn right onto Taxiway A, the First Officer spotted a tow vehicle on adjacent Taxiway B proceeding straight without slowing down. He immediately notified the Captain to brake, avoiding a collision. It was later learned that the tow vehicle was using a different ground frequency and failed to hear the instruction issued by ATC.

6. To use GPS or not? While on the ground at Okinawa’s Naha Airport, “NAV UNABLE RNP” appeared and disappeared several times on the EICAS. The SID was the RNAV1 EISAR procedure. The pilot believed that GPS was not necessary for RNAV1, so they turned off the GPS and took off. However, subsequent analysis suggested that a GPS update should have been performed on the ground, or a different SID should have been requested. Below is the note from the <a href=https://yinlei.org/x-plane10/view1.php?file=doc/AIP-J/ROAH_Naha.pdf>Naha Airport chart on this site: Note ※The aircraft equipped with only DME/DME/IRU must be able to update its position without delay at the starting point of take-off roll. 1 ) DME/DME/IRU or GNSS required. 2 ) RADAR service required.

7. Changing altitude via MCP in moderate Turbulence Applying for a change from FL330 to FL310 while encountering Turbulence, but it was mysteriously set to FL300. Fortunately, the First Officer noticed and corrected it before Leveling Off. Therefore, one cannot rely solely on the MCP; the data on the screen must also be monitored carefully.

8. To err is human There were quite a few reports regarding human error in this issue:

   • The Radio frequency was switched between Active and Standby at some unknown time;
   • ATC intended to descend the aircraft to FL230, but verbally said FL210;
   • ATC said FL370 for the altitude change, but the pilot heard FL270;
   • Believed to be using VNAV PATH MODE, but actually switched to VNAV SPEED MODE earlier due to wind speed changes and forgot, resulting in an excessively fast approach speed;
   • Lowered the Flaps momentarily while exceeding the limit speed;
   • ATC requested a right circuit, but the Captain heard a left circuit;
   • The Captain side adjusted the Barometric correction value from 30.11 to 28.80 by mistake. Naturally, the autopilot flew too low. They hurriedly switched to manual flight and only noticed the difference between left and right sides through the “BARO Set Disagree” message;
   • Entered “APOLO” for a direct to “ARLON”; And so on. Fortunately, due to multiple check mechanisms, no major issues occurred.

9. In-flight equipment issues? I feel that some of these might be software issues rather than hardware:

   • The Radio Tower Standby frequency displayed switching to Active, but the actual audio received was still Approach;
   • After changing several times, it finally switched to Tower, at which point the altitude was only 1500 feet;
   • Using IAN (Integrated Approach Navigation) for a non-precision approach, sometimes the Bank Angle is unstable. It is said that this occurs when pressing APP while deviating from the Final Approach Course during an approach with a short distance after the FAF;
   • VNAV could not be armed before the FAF. Investigation later revealed that VNAV cannot be armed if the waypoint ahead is higher than the current altitude.

10. Altitude issue with RNP AR Using barometric altitude during RNP AR. When using the METAR QNH value of 3022, all 4 PAPI lights were red. It was only discovered after landing that this was exactly the value before the METAR changed; the actual value during landing was 3018.

11. Go-Around mode accidentally triggered when deploying reverse thrust on landing Using Autoland at a certain airport. Upon landing, while initiating reverse thrust, the index finger accidentally touched the TOGA button. The screen display also changed to GA mode. At this point, a Go-Around should have been continued, but since the departure was already delayed by 30 minutes, there was a subconscious desire to continue landing. Therefore, the autothrottle was disconnected, the nose was lowered, reverse thrust was continued, and the autopilot was disconnected. However, during the process, “Pitch attitude high at Landing” occurred—the pitch angle was too high. Fortunately, there was no tail strike.

Summary Humans are not machines, and errors will inevitably occur, especially in busy and tense situations. However, a mechanism and environment that does not evade problems, does not hide one’s own faults, and shares them amiably with others is truly precious and worth learning from for us outsiders.